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Humanitarianism with missiles: when “civilian protection” becomes a legal facade for war
Following the onset of the Ramadan War and the U.S.–Israeli attacks on Iran, the familiar rhetoric resurfaced: the claim of “humanitarian intervention”—a term that appears benevolent but has increasingly served as a veneer for legitimizing military force against populations. These expressions, though framed in moral language, have in practice brought grave harm to the people of the Middle East.
International law, however, does not remain silent in the face of such semantic distortion. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter unequivocally prohibits the use of force in international relations, recognizing only two exceptions: self‑defense under Article 51, and collective action authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. No state or coalition may unilaterally wage war in another country under vague notions of “protection” or “liberation of peoples.”
The notion of humanitarian intervention has never crystallized into an accepted rule of international law. Even the International Court of Justice, in the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States case, affirmed that humanitarian motives cannot justify the use of force. This logic reappears in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine: any military action for civilian protection must occur strictly through the Security Council and within the Charter framework, not through unilateral action by powerful states.
Even when the use of force is authorized by the Security Council, military operations remain bound by international humanitarian law, which prohibits harming civilians and civilian objects. Yet the attacks attributed to the United States and Israel inflicted severe harm on civilians, reportedly resulting in 1,500 civilian deaths—45 percent of total casualties. This high proportion of civilian losses underscores the contradiction inherent in the attackers’ claims. Among the most morally indefensible strikes were those on schools such as Minab School, the Tofigh Darou pharmaceutical company, ambulances, hospitals, and residential areas.
Now, the same narrative—using the same vocabulary—is being invoked regarding the people of Iran. Framing attacks as “civilian protection” does not alter the fact that, under international law, such actions constitute a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force. Even with Security Council authorization, these operations would still be bound by core humanitarian principles: distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality, and precaution in attack. No humanitarian label can justify strikes on hospitals, medical warehouses, or residential neighborhoods.
This is why many international legal scholars warn against the recurrent instrumentalization of humanitarian terminology. The experiences of Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan clearly show that when humanitarian slogans become tools for legitimizing war, the first victims are the very people they claim to protect.
The conclusion is clear:“Humanitarian intervention” and the “responsibility to protect” are not legal licenses for war. Any military operation carried out outside the framework of international law and the UN Charter constitutes aggression—even when wrapped in moral or humanitarian pretexts.